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VALUING LOVE AND VALUING  
THE SELF IN IRIS MURDOCH
Tony Milligan
RESUMEN
El artículo cuestiona aspectos de la interpretación de D. Velleman, la cual parte de un 
acercamiento entre el amor en Murdoch y el respeto en Kant. Esta aproximación es inexac-
ta porque el amor para Murdoch no se define solamente por lo cognitivo, sino que incluye 
una dimensión conativa (deseo orientado hacia el otro particular) Además se propone una 
forma de reconocer el valor de sí mismo sin basarlo en el amor o respeto de sí mismo.
Palabras clave: amor, respeto de sí mismo, egoismo, Iris Murdoch.
ABSTRACT
David Velleman’s influential analytic reworking of Iris Murdoch’s account of love 
is problematic. It proposes a rapprochement between Murdochian love and Kantian re-
spect. Both are taken to be responses to, and recognitions of, personhood. I shall try to 
show that Velleman’s emphasis upon recognition (hence vision) is faithful to Murdoch, but 
his treatment of love as (i) a purely cognitive response; and (ii) a response which is ori-
ented towards sheer personhood, departs from her position. Murdochian love is both cog-
nitive and connative, it includes desire oriented towards particular others. The paper will 
go on to address a problem that Velleman’s reading of Murdoch obscures, the problem of 
recognizing self-worth without appealing to self-love. I will suggest a way in which Murdoch 
can manage to do so by attending to the importance of seeing ourselves in the light of an-
other’s love.
Iris Murdoch figures repeatedly in contemporary discussions within the philosophy 
of love, and particularly in work by philosophers who write within the analytic tradition. 
However, there is a gulf between Murdoch’s own way of writing about love and the way 
in which love is treated in contemporary analytic debates. An added complication is that 
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an influential analytic account of love set out by David Velleman over a decade ago claims 
to be broadly in line with Murdoch’s approach. This is an association that may not en-
tirely help her case, given that Velleman’s position, while still a core reference point, is 
currently out of favour. What follows will nonetheless be broadly sympathetic to Velleman’s 
strategy of appealing to Murdoch while curtailing the role that love has to play by setting 
it alongside some other moral response or responses. But I will be less sympathetic to-
wards Velleman’s way of reading Murdoch and his execution of this curtailing strategy. 
The final section of the paper will address a problem that Velleman’s reading of Murdoch 
helps to obscure, the problem of recognizing self-worth without appealing to self-love. I 
will suggest a way in which Murdoch’s commitment to (i) a self/other asymmetry that 
requires love to be directed outwards, towards others, can be sustained while allowing for 
(ii) a recognition of the value of the self that does not take the form of self-love or self-
respect.
Keywords: love, self-respect, selfishness, Iris Murdoch.
I. Faith, Hope and Love
In Vision and Choice in Morality, we encounter one of Iris Murdoch’s 
earliest appeals to the reality-disclosing work that love can do. ‘There are, how-
ever, moments when situations are unclear and what is needed is not a renewed 
attempt to specify “facts”, but a fresh vision which may be derived from a 
“story” or from some sustaining concept which is able to deal with what is 
obstinately obscure, and represents a “mode of understanding” of an alterna-
tive type. Such concepts are, of course, not necessarily recondite or sophisti-
cated; “hope” and “love” are two of them’ (Murdoch 1999, 91).  Murdoch’s 
suggestion is that a particular hopeful or loving way of seeing can improve our 
moral vision. This may seem like a beautiful but implausible idea. After all, a 
loving gaze or a hopeful way of looking may provide insight, but it may instead 
mislead and distort. 
Murdoch’s early response to this concern, in Vision and Choice is to ac-
cept that when a full and precise description of a situation eludes us, we must 
try to look in a loving or hopeful way and simply accept that we may be wrong. 
In all but the most resistant of circumstances we must simply have ‘faith’ that 
a hopeful and loving way of seeing will also be a realistic way of seeing (Mur-
doch 1999, 90). This language of ‘faith’, ‘hope’ and a kind of ‘love’ borrows 
heavily from Christianity. And so too does Murdoch’s justification for her po-
sition. There is, in Vision and Choice, no clearly worked-out defence of the 
loving gaze. Instead, there is a rather awkward justification by faith. This is not 
the assertive faith of Martin Luther and not faith that is underpinned by belief 
in any supernatural agent who will ensure that everyone ultimately gets what 
they deserve. Instead, it is the faith of the individual who knows that love and 
hope can err, and that a loving way of seeing may not always yield clarity.
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Even so, a good deal of Murdoch’s subsequent writing, in her philosoph-
ical texts and in her novels, attempts to show that a loving gaze will tend to be 
reliable. It will tend to disclose more often than it conceals because a loving 
gaze removes or at least resists egocentric sources of distortion. In doing so it 
improves our overall ability to see what there is to be seen. ‘The love which 
brings the right answer is an exercise of justice and realism and really looking’ 
(Murdoch 2001, 89). This resistance to the distorting impact of egocentricity 
provides us with a straightforward reason for trust in the power of love. But 
while this gives us a reason to allow that in general love reveals rather than 
conceals, it may do little to remove uncertainty about how love operates in 
particular cases where the possibility of over-estimation and giving too much 
credit to the other remain in place.
A familiar context in which this problem arises is Murdoch’s case of D 
and M in The Sovereignty of Good. Love, paired with justice, allows a mother-
in-law to see her daughter-in-law as lively rather than crude. Love allows the 
mother-in-law to see in a less jealous and (we are led to assume) more realistic 
manner. But here we may wonder how she, or the reader, can be sure that a 
gain has been made? Christine Swanton voices this concern by asking ‘What 
if the daughter-in-law really is vulgar and juvenile?’ (Swanton 2003, 112). And 
this seems like a reasonable question. When it comes to particular cases of this 
sort, faith and hope still seem to be at work. We may at least suspect that, for 
Murdoch, however much work we may do to supply reasons, faith remains an 
ineradicable feature of moral life. There are times when we just do not know, 
but must nonetheless find some acceptable way to proceed, times when we 
need something to rely on. At times of this sort, Murdoch wants us to keep 
faith with love not just because it tends to yield clarity, but because love is 
something good and worthwhile in itself. The fact that it also happens to be 
instrumentally useful may obscure this dimension of love’s value. 
Nonetheless, love’s instrumental role will remain important if, as Mur-
doch suggests, love is our best and most indispensible guide and if, as Murdoch 
suggests in the very same text, ‘the central concept of morality is “the indi-
vidual” thought of as knowable by love’ (Murdoch 2001, 29). For Murdoch, 
love seems to be both valuable in itself and required to do work that other re-
sponses, such as respect, cannot do.  
II. Velleman’s Kantian Reading of Murdoch
One of Murdoch’s fictional characters takes this sense of love’s value 
to extremes and suggests that ‘all our failures are ultimately failures in love’ 
(Murdoch 1962, 235). This idea has strong associations with the tradition of 
Christian thought about love and it captures, beautifully, the idea that love mat-
ters in a unique way. But here we may wonder whether it matters in just this 
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way. Surely we can and do fail regularly in our moral responsibilities towards 
strangers, but it is not obvious that such failures are always failures of love. We 
may fail to show some unfamiliar person hospitality and compassion, but it is 
tempting to say that we cannot love such an unfamiliar person and that our 
inability to love them is not a moral weakness, but is a feature of what love is 
like. Love (by which I mean genuine love and not some plausible imitation) 
is a response to a shared history which in the case of strangers happens to be 
missing. But if we cannot love them, it follows that our failure to give them 
their due is a failure of some other sort. And here, perhaps, we might want 
to think about failures of compassion, of respect and of justice. 
But perhaps it may be tempting to follow a more Christian line of thought 
and to say that in some sense we can and ought to love everyone, but not neces-
sarily in the same manner or with the same kind of love. Love for strangers 
will then be one kind of love, love for friends and neighbours will be love of 
another sort, but action and response ought always and everywhere to be open 
to the influence of love of some sort. What is worrying here is that this threat-
ens to place an intolerable burden upon love. If every move that we make ought 
to be, in some respect, informed by love, then love will have to take on so many 
forms that the connection between what Murdoch means (or ought to mean) 
by ‘love’ and our ordinary familiar understanding of the concept may be lost. 
Love will be left to do too much work. 
This is a danger that Murdoch tries to address in her later writings when 
she sets love alongside duty, moral principles and a reasonable concern for 
our own happiness. Her way of curtailing the demands upon love involves a 
move in a Kantian direction. And it mirrors Kant’s own shift in his later writ-
ings, and especially in The Doctrine of Virtue where he abandons a prior 
suspicion about love and finally situates it within the domain of the moral. 
His earlier dismissal of love as pathological (in the Groundwork), and (even 
worse) beyond our wilful control, is replaced by an appeal to duties of love 
and to a distinction between love and respect as complementary moral re-
sponses that involve drawing close and keeping our distance. ‘The duty of 
love for one’s neighbour can, accordingly, also be expressed as the duty to 
make other ends my own (provided that these are not immoral). The duty of 
respect for my neighbour is contained in the maxim not to degrade any other 
to a mere means to my ends (not to demand that another throw himself away 
in order to slave for my end)’ (Kant 1996, 199). On this account, love seems 
to involve altruistic desire that the lives of others should go well. More for-
mally, it involves adopting the ends pursued by others. By contrast, respect 
involves restraint, restraint of a sort that involves recognition that others have 
autonomy as well as interests (although the two are connected). Together, love 
and respect may seem to relieve one another of the burden of having to do too 
much. On the Kantian side, this is a matter of making sure that the role of 
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respect is not stretched too far. On Murdoch’s side, it is a matter of safeguard-
ing love. 
Both end up with a conception of moral life where love is centrally placed, 
but is not called upon to do everything. And although Kant’s understanding of 
the love in question is based upon the Christian exemplar of love for our neigh-
bours, while Murdoch’s exemplars are always more intimate, the distance be-
tween the two may now seem to be much less than we might imagine if we had 
read only Kant’s Groundwork and Murdoch’s response to it in The Sovereign-
ty of Good. So, we may wonder, just how far apart were Kant and Murdoch on 
the place of love in the life that is lived well? 
According to David Velleman, they were not far apart at all. Their posi-
tions converge once the Kantian account is charitably reformulated to remove 
any suggestion that love involves desire. The connection between love and desire 
is, for Velleman, a misleading myth reinforced by Freudianism, a myth that 
threatens to render love covertly egocentric. While my comments so far have 
committed me to the view that love should not be left to do an impossible 
amount of work, and they have leaned clearly in the direction of bringing Mur-
doch and Kant closer together, I want to draw attention to some shortcomings 
in Velleman’s way of doing so, shortcomings in his way of relieving love of 
some of its burden.
Velleman’s combined appropriation of Kant and Murdoch is immediate-
ly geared to address and to combat a particular position in the philosophy of 
love, a position set up by Harry Frankfurt. On Frankfurt’s account (with vari-
ous qualifications) the lover cares for the beloved, desires their well-being and, 
in doing so, comes to confer value upon the beloved. ‘The lover does not in-
variably and necessarily perceive the beloved as valuable, but the value he sees 
it to possess is a value that derives from and that depends upon his love’ 
(Frankfurt 2004, 39). This comes perilously close to saying that the lover pro-
jects value, a view that fits conveniently with a series of metaethical commit-
ments that have more to do with David Hume than with either Iris Murdoch or 
Immanuel Kant (or, indeed, David Velleman). Murdoch, in particular, is clear-
ly committed to the idea that the value of others is part of the world. It is not, 
of course, part of the world as it is described by our best science, but it is part of 
the world as it is experienced by moral agents. Murdoch, Kant and Velleman 
all allow that value may be discerned or figuratively seen and both Murdoch 
and Velleman hold that it may be seen by ‘really looking’. It is not my intention 
to take a detour through the familiar naturalist and non-naturalist underpin-
nings of this position, suffice it to say that moral realism of some sort, and the 
use of a visual metaphor for seeing that other matters, go together.
It is this visual aspect of Murdoch’s approach to love, her treatment of 
love as a discernment of the other, that appeals to Velleman. Love (on a broad-
ly Murdochian account) and respect (on a broadly Kantian account) are taken 
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by Velleman to be complementary ways in which we recognize the inherent 
value of persons. More precisely, for Velleman, respect ‘arrests our self-love’ 
and our readiness to use others simply as a means. To respect is to see the 
other as separate and as an independent centre of value. By contrast, he claims 
that ‘Love disarms our emotional defenses; it makes us vulnerable to the other’ 
(Velleman 1999, 360, 361). That is to say, love does not arrest our self-love, but 
rather it arrests our self- protective egocentricity. While the line between these 
two is rather fine, this way of representing matters helps to explain why love is 
an exercise in ‘really looking’, just as Murdoch claims (Velleman 1999, 334). 
‘Many of our defenses against being emotionally affected by another per-
son are ways of not seeing what is most affecting about him. This contrived 
blindness to the other person is among the defenses that are lifted by love, with 
the result that we really look at him, perhaps for the first time, and respond 
emotionally in a way that’s indicative of having really seen him’ (Velleman 
1999, 361). This is broadly similar to Murdoch’s view that love is an opening 
up in the sense that it is ‘the extremely difficult realization that something other 
than oneself is real’ (Murdoch 1999, 215). I shall accept that Velleman’s ac-
count is in this respect a broadly Murdochian account of love, but there is a 
strictness and an exclusiveness about the Velleman account that is at odds with 
Murdoch’s position. More specifically, Velleman not only resists Frankfurt’s 
reduction of love to desires that result in the projection of value, he goes on to 
suggest that desires are only ever the regular accompaniments of love and are 
not constitutive parts of love itself. 
I will suggest that on this matter of desires Murdoch and Kant are closer 
in line with one another than Velleman  allows. Both regard love as at least 
partly conative, as a response that includes some component of desire. This 
component of desire helps us to make sense of the Kantian (and indeed Pla-
tonic) metaphor of love as drawing close or as a matter of wanting to be near 
or to be in the presence of. I will also suggest that Velleman’s exclusion of 
desire makes familiar features of love difficult to explain. 
Love that is purely cognitive, purely a matter of seeing (and that has no 
component of desiring) will have the convenient feature that it involves no dis-
position to meddle in the affairs of others or to act in ways that might compro-
mise their autonomy. With love’s wings clipped in this way, the potential for 
conflict between an intrusive love and a distance accepting Kantian respect is 
minimal. This is part of Velleman’s strategy for showing that love is a moral 
emotion and is not a threat to good moral agency. On the other hand, it is no 
longer quite so clear why respect might be required to rein in love. They both 
seem to be performing roles that are so close to one another that the serious 
prospect of any major tension between the two is excluded. And this does not 
seem to reflect what moral life is like. Furthermore, Velleman does not simply 
claim that love and respect complement one another. He claims that they have 
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a shared intentionality such that, when we love someone, we are not respond-
ing to their unique or distinctive quirks or idiosyncracies, ‘we are responding 
to the value that he possesses by virtue of being a person or, as Kant would say, 
an instance of rational nature’ (Velleman 1999, 365). Love, like Kantian re-
spect, turns out to be a response to, and more precisely a recognition of, ra-
tional personhood.
It is at this point that Velleman’s approach ceases to sound like an ana-
lytic clarification of Murdoch’s position and begins to sounds instead like an 
attempt to turn Murdoch into a covert and reluctant Kantian. This makes Vel-
leman’s reading problematic. Murdoch, notoriously, insists that love is a re-
sponse to the unique and the particular, to the individual who is thought of as 
‘knowable by love’ (Murdoch 2001, 29). From a Murdochian point of view, 
what we see when we ‘really look’ is not always going to be the same. As a 
result, it is difficult to avoid Elijah Millgram’s conclusion that ‘although Velle-
man has adopted some of Murdoch’s turns of phrase, he has abandoned Mur-
doch’s interpretation of love and of vision’ (Millgram 2004, 512). Velleman’s 
response to this (anticipated) objection is that Murdoch’s emphasis upon par-
ticularity is couched in a language of ‘impersonality, detachment and realism’. 
Such an emphasis upon being fair, just and realistic, or as Velleman says ‘strict-
ly objective’, suggests that loving a particular person is not actually a matter of 
partiality. It is not a matter of responding to something that one individual may 
have and that others might lack (Velleman 1999, 342). For Velleman, Murdoch 
is not, on the whole, saying what she seems to be saying in those passages 
where particularity is emphasized.
We have, I think, two main reasons for rejecting this claim. The first is that 
Millgram’s reading is simply more faithful to Murdoch’s texts. It is one thing 
to say that, in The Sovereignty of Good and perhaps elsewhere, Murdoch is 
unfair to Kant and, as a result, she over-estimates the gulf between her position 
and his. But it is quite another matter to suggest that behind or beneath her 
concern for the unique and the particular, Murdoch is covertly promoting an 
impartialist ethic. Here we may note that the phrasing of ‘strictly objective’ be-
longs to Velleman and not to Murdoch and that the bias overcome by the lov-
ing Murdochian gaze is not partiality per se, but is a special and distorting kind 
of partiality in favour of the importance of the self.  Partiality in favour of others, 
partiality that is a recognition of special bonds and connections (such as those 
between lovers, or between parent and child or between mother-in-law and 
daughter-in-law) does not seem to be in any way ruled out by any Murdoch text. 
Secondly, Velleman’s account of love’s intentionality (that love is a re-
sponse to sheer rational personhood) is implausible and it therefore does no 
favours to Murdoch to suggest that her position agrees with Velleman’s or that 
the latter is a charitable analytic reconstruction of the former. But my concern 
here is not simply with the way in which regarding love as a response to per-
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sonhood stands in the way of our appreciation that non-persons can also be 
loved. I also have a concern about the way in which this view fails to do justice 
to the phenomenology of love when the love in question does happen to be 
directed towards someone who is a person. When we are in love with other 
people, our concern does not seem to be about anything so abstract as their 
rational personhood. 
Furthermore, if love, like Kantian respect, is a response to rational per-
sonhood, then we will have equally good reasons for loving all rational agents. 
Velleman’s position is that, ultimately in some sense we do. Here, I will sug-
gest that while others may be, generally if not universally, lovable, in the sense 
that there is no barrier to their being loved for a good reason or for a good 
cluster of reasons, this is not the same as saying that the reasons for love are in 
each case identical. In a straightforward way, there is a difference between 
claiming (i) all persons are worthy of love; and (ii) our reasons for loving one 
person are just as good as our reasons for loving another because our reasons 
for love are always ultimately the same.
The first of these claims draws upon a basic commitment of Christianity 
that I will not dispute here (although I do consider it problematic in the case of 
individuals who have betrayed their humanity). The second claim is straight-
forwardly implausible, although it is not implausible because it appeals to there 
being reasons for love, which is, after all, shared ground between Murdoch, 
Velleman and, I suspect, the later Kant. 
Velleman tries to soften the implausibility of his endorsement of (ii) by 
pointing out that of course we cannot love everyone simultaneously. But, in a 
move that is strikingly reminiscent of Freud, this is regarded by Velleman as 
simply a matter of economy. We have a limited amount of love to go around 
and so we direct it (in Freudian terms we ‘cathect it’) towards those whose 
quirks, personal traits and peculiarities help us to recognize the deeper reality 
of their personhood. But these quirks, traits and peculiarities operate only as 
enablers for our love, they are not themselves reasons for love. Ultimately, the 
only defensible reason for love is that someone is a rational moral agent or, 
more simply, a person. 
What this fails to do justice to is the idea that loving someone involves 
seeing them as irreplaceable. This is a feature of love that helps to explain a 
great deal about love and loss. It helps to explain the phenomenology of grief. 
Irreplaceability is also a feature of love that Velleman does not dispute. To do 
so would place his account of love too far from our ordinary understanding of 
what love involves. But his way of making room for irreplaceability is by sug-
gesting that while love is a response to the generic value of personhood, it is 
also a response that involves a refusal to measure persons against any potential 
replacements. However, this seems akin to a special kind of stubbornness and 
is, in no way the perception of actual uniqueness. And so here we may wonder, 
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that is to say I am inclined to wonder, whether Velleman has given himself the 
right resources to resist Frankfurt’s idea that love is associated with the projec-
tion of a special importance.
It is difficult to resist the view that regarding others as irreplaceable, if it 
is to be more than projection or stubbornness, requires appeal to properties that 
the loved individual and only the loved individual happens to possess. And this 
cannot be a matter of rational personhood, on whatever account of the latter 
we happen to prefer. What Velleman does have going in his favour is the point 
that any appeal to mere quirks and idiosyncracies will not help us to make 
sense of such properties. If, for example, I love Suzanne because of the way 
that she wears her hat and sips her tea, I will also have a reason to love anyone 
else who happens to wear their hat and sip tea in precisely the same way (Vel-
leman 1999, 371). In a rather extreme case, if I love her because of her enticing 
physiological quirks, I should also love any physiologically exact duplicate of 
her, and I should love such a duplicate for precisely the same reason that I love 
the original.
There is, however, a standard way of dealing with the problem of unique-
ness by pointing out that the relational properties of others do make them unique 
and that such properties may plausibly be appealed to as giving us reasons for 
loving them. I may for example love Suzanne because she was the person I met 
at the end of my teens who sat out with me under the stars and who cared for 
me when I did not expect her to. Even a physiologically exact copy would lack 
this history. This is (broadly) the line taken against Velleman by Niko Kolodny 
(with, perhaps a few cognitive demands too many) and at present it repre-
sents (with many variations) the dominant position in the philosophy of love. In 
more familiar terms, drawing from Wittgensteinian literature, love is a response 
to a shared history. And it is a response to an individual whose history makes 
them unique. Even a perfect duplicate could not have my past, or the past of the 
woman I love (Kolodny 2003; Cockburn 1990, 154-5). 
While it would be a stretch to suggest that Murdoch anticipates this ap-
peal to relational properties, the less heavily analytic appeal to a shared past is 
at least consistent with her position and with her concern for individuals as the 
product of a history that shapes and bounds their moral vision (a key theme of 
The Idea of Perfection). It is also worth noting that Murdoch persistently situ-
ates love within the context of an existing connection to the other. Her exem-
plary case of love in The Sovereignty of Good is an appeal to a mother-in-law 
and a daughter-in-law and not to two strangers on a train. And part of what 
makes her case of D and M work is that we can understand the standpoint of 
the mother-in-law as someone who re-evaluates the role that her daughter-in-
law has played. This daughter-in-law gave her son a chance of happiness and 
enriched her own life or at least would have done so had the mother-in-law 
been more open and just or less possessive and jealous. This involves, as Mur-
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doch recognizes when she considers that the daughter-in-law may now be dead, 
an attitude towards the past and not simply towards what is immediately pre-
sent. I will suggest that all love is like this. That is to say, the intentionality of 
love is mixed, it is not purely a response to an immediately present other or to 
their sheer rational personhood. And it is for this reason that love for strangers 
is excluded (Milligan 2011, 127-32). Moral relations with them ought to be 
thought of in other terms, such as respect, compassion and duty, concepts that 
need not be bound up with the recognition of a shared history.
III. The Direction of Love
However, it is not just Velleman’s mistaken view that love and respect share 
the same intentionality that threatens to obscure important aspects of Murdoch’s 
account of love. There are two further, and important, features of Murdoch’s 
approach to love that Velleman’s account sets aside or fails to accommodate. 
Firstly, and as already noted, Velleman insists upon a strictly recogni-
tional account of love with no constitutive component of desire. Love is purely 
cognitive and not conative. This fails to do justice to the way in which Mur-
doch associates love with Platonic eros and thereby distinguishes it from a 
Christian account of love that is directly modelled (as Kant’s account of love 
seems to be) upon legitimate concern for our neighbours. The whole point of 
deploying a metaphor of ‘eros’ by contrast with ‘agape’, ‘philia’, ‘caritas’ or just 
plain ‘love’ is that doing so sets up sexual desire and longing as in some re-
spects a good starting point for understanding love of any sort. This is a stand-
ard Platonic move and it favours, I think necessitates, the inclusion of a com-
ponent of desire as well as a component of recognition within love. 
In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, Murdoch is explicit about this mat-
ter. ‘”Eros” is the continuous operation of spiritual energy, desire, intellect, 
love, as it moves along and responds to particular objects of attention . . . good 
and bad desires with good and bad objects’ (Murdoch 1993, 496). Note how 
the continuous operation of this figurative energy of eros brings together the 
cognitive and the connative, the intellect and desire. This being the case, how 
worried should we be about Murdoch’s apparent inclusion of desire as a con-
stitutive part of love? Does it, for example, mean that love must be egocentric, 
with eros operating more or less in the same manner as Freudian libido? Not 
obviously, desires may, as Velleman acknowledges, take the form of altruistic 
concern or longing for the well-being of others. But when loving desire is al-
truistic in this way, does the love involve a meddlesome disposition of the sort 
that worried Kant and which Velleman is at pains to exclude? Here, it may be 
pointed out that a disposition to meddle is not the same as actual meddling. 
Such desires, reined in by a recognition of the separateness of others, by a 
recognition of the fact that they have their own lives, seems to fit rather well 
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with the phenomenology of love. Often, we may want to help, but we may also 
feel that we ought to stand back and let the person that we love find their own 
way. Murdoch’s novels contain agents who feel the pull of both considerations. 
There are, furthermore, no obvious reasons why moral life should not include 
tensions of just this sort, tensions that help to motivate the claim that a plausi-
ble account of moral life needs to find room for both love and respect. 
Secondly, Velleman’s way of attempting to bring together love and im-
partial respect obscures a central feature of Murdoch’s treatment of love’s nor-
mativity. For Kant, it is an admirable feature of respect that what it responds to 
in others is what we ourselves possess: I have rational personhood just as you 
do and both are equally worthy of respect. This entitlement of others to re-
spect generates a reason for self-respect. By contrast, the appropriate object of 
our love in Murdoch is always other than the self. Love, in the sense of a mor-
ally defensible love, is the extremely difficult realization that something other 
than oneself is real. Murdoch not only endorses partiality, she more specifi-
cally adheres to a strong self/other asymmetry in which (as something of an 
impractical over-statement) ‘the direction of attention should properly be out-
ward’ (Murdoch 2001, 58). This is not to say that an everyday commonplace 
concern for our own happiness must be overlooked, but it does mean that 
such concern ought not to be thought of as a matter of self-love. 
IV. The Recognition of Self-Worth
What this leaves us with is, inconveniently, a problem about the recogni-
tion of our own worth, a problem that is all the more acute if we resist the 
temptation to equate Murdoch’s project of a figurative ‘unselfing’ with self-
abnegation and restrict it, instead, to the curtailing of egocentricity (Milligan 
2007b and 2010). How may we come to recognize our worth by looking out-
wards towards what is other? Here I want to allow that there is an awkward-
ness about Murdoch’s commitment to valuing ourselves and doing so in a le-
gitimate manner. Or at least there is an awkwardness about valuing the self in 
her philosophical texts. In the novels, valuing the self is taken for granted in or-
der to picture what life is like in a realistic manner. 
I want to present a story about valuing love that may help us to under-
stand that valuing ourselves involves more than the recognition of our rational 
personhood, and it involves something that does not obviously constitute self-
love (or, minimally, it does not constitute self-love in any morally troubling 
sense). Love is ordinarily valued and seen as important because of its motiva-
tional role. A recognition of this is central to Harry Frankfurt’s account of why 
love matters (although Frankfurt does in fact tie this motivational role to 
self-love) (Frankfurt 2004).  The same point about motivation is at the heart of 
Plato’s concept of eros and it figures as well in Murdoch. I will accept that 
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love’s depth and its value is, in part, a matter of this indispensible motiva-
tional role. However, love is deep in a way that makes it a necessary require-
ment for well-being because our appreciation of our own worth is bound up 
with the recognition that we too are intelligible objects of love (Milligan 2011, 
compare with Gaita 2000). More specifically, it is bound up with the recogni-
tion that we are loveable by others. This requires the actual experience of 
having been loved by someone whose responses are, in at least some matters 
of the heart, regarded as authoritative. (Or at least believing that we have been 
loved in this way.) 
In Murdoch’s novel Bruno’s Dream, there is an illuminating treatment of 
the way in which the love of another plays this role of facilitating a sense of self-
worth. Murdoch centres the novel upon Bruno, an old man who has become 
increasingly cut off from others and is now confined to bed. His sole carer is a 
son-in-law who has inherited Bruno just as he has inherited the family printing 
works. These two damaged men have a shared history together and each feels 
something for the other but, if it is love, it is love of a sort that neither can read-
ily acknowledge.
Up to a point, Bruno still retains his mental faculties. His physical move-
ment is restricted, but he continues to reason well enough to torture himself 
with thoughts about the past, about the son he has alienated and the wife he has 
betrayed. Fear of her dreadful reproaches kept Bruno away from her deathbed, 
but now he is dying and cannot escape from the desire to try and make order 
out of the disorder of his life. Bruno’s greatest torment is not the suffering of a 
man whose autonomy is all but spent, it is the more dreadful thought that he 
has, at the end, become monstrous, an unlovable being. In earlier days, Bru-
no had the beginnings of a scholarly interest in spiders. In the room where he 
is going to die, he now feels himself to be a spindly creature, withered in body 
and with an implausibly large head. He has no sense that, had his wife lived, 
she would now love him.
While there is no medical recovery for Bruno, matters do change and 
improve. His steady loss of autonomy, like his medical condition, is irreversi-
ble. But there is a return of love, of a sort, from a woman who is brought to the 
house by his son-in-law. With her, a different, if brief and loving relationship 
begins to grow. The love is not sexualized but it does answer a longing. For 
Bruno, it is love that he can recognize and accept with wonder and gratitude. 
And this recognition of being loved by another authoritative being brings an 
awakening of other possibilities concerning his sexualized relationship with 
his wife. While sex itself is no longer an option, being loved shows him that he 
is not morally or physically monstrous, he is not unlovable. And with this comes 
the realization (partly insight but again partly faith and hope) that the wife 
he betrayed was calling out at the end so that she could forgive him, so that she 
could be with him. Bruno, who has until now been tormented by the past, comes 
to see it in a new way. This is not redemption, it does not undo all the wrongs 
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and untangle the web of his mistakes, but it provides a pathway towards ac-
ceptance of personal failings rather than despair about the self.
The case of Bruno illustrates the importance of being ready to acknowl-
edge and to accept the love of others and above all to accept its genuineness. I 
want to close by suggesting that the case of Bruno also shows a way in which 
Murdoch can hold onto the view that the proper direction of love is outwards 
while also acknowledging that self-valuing is a legitimate form of valuing (Mil-
ligan 2010). For Murdoch, the recognition of our own value does not require 
self-love and it does not reduce down to a respectful recognition of autonomy 
or rational personhood. Rather, valuing the self in the right way requires that 
we look outwards with a just and loving gaze and see ourselves in the light of 
the love of others. 
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